Towards rupture or stasis? An Analysis of the 1981 South African general election by Charney, Craig
cO- " UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
-' yS-' < A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
TOWARDS RUPTURE OR STASIS? An Analysis of the 1981
South African General Election
by Craig R. Charney
The results of the 1981 white general election in
South Africa seemed paradoxical to many observers. After
three decades in which white politics appeared dominated by
the unchallengeable hegemony of the ruling National Party,
white party politics seemed to have taken on a new turbulence
and uncertainty. The Sunday Times reported, "Nat Voters
Bolt to the Right", while the Transvaier he^llined a "Left-
wards swing". Very few seats actually changed hands, yet
many commentators sensed that the election was a watershed.
The confusing aspects of the election resulted from
tne play of contradictory political and social forces.
This paper contends that the old ethnic-based class alliances
which formed the basis of the white South African party
system are unravelling. Though power did not change hands,
the 1981 election traced the outline of a possible class
realignment of white political forces, with potentially
far-reaching consequences. In the aftermath, nothing seemed
to have changed, but nothing would ever be quite the same.
To illuminate the changes underway, we will begin with
a discussion of the background to the election, then skip
ahead to consider the patterns of change evident in the elec-
tion results. This is followed by an examination of survey
data to discern the emerging class division, and of how the
strategy of the parties promoted or retarded its expression.
The paper concludes with the implications of the new trends
in the white electorate for the future of white politics
in South Africa.
BACKGROUND TO THE ELECTION
In its first full year in office, 1979, Mr. P W Botha's
government began to outline a programme of reforms aimed at
winning black acquiescence at home and support for his regime
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abroad. This programme was never spelt out in full, but
it included acceptance of the Wiehahn Report on black trade
unions, the Riekert recommendations on streamlining the pass
laws, and hints that the Immorality Act could be changed.
During the year, Mr Botha visited Soweto as a symbolic gesture
of concern for urban blacks. He appointed commissions to
study various contentious issues, and even declared at
Upington that the National Party Programme of Principles—
the holy of holies — needed rewriting.
The goals of the reforms envisioned appeared to be:
1. removing barriers to social mobility for the black
petit bourgeoisie;
2. the incorporation of a layer of skilled blacks
into the labour aristocracy;
3. concentrating resources to modestly upgrade the lot
or urban blacks, while sealing rural Africans out
of the cities through tighter influx controls;
4. incorporating so-called Coloure^s ^ n& Indians into
the white political system ; and
5. eliminating many discriminatory laws which provoked
opprobrium abroad while doing little to reinforce
white privilege.
The symbolic high point of this reformist period was the
Carlton Centre conference of November 1979. At this gathering,
the Prime Minister met with English and Afrikaans-speaking
businessmen for discussions where a large measure of consensus
on social and political issues was expressed. The outlines
of a new "free enterprise" government policy became sharper,
in which primary responsibility for protecting white privilege
and profits would rest with the market, rather than racial
law.
While the gains such a policy would offer blacks were
limited, someone would have to foot the bill. That someone
increasingly appeared to be the beneficiaries of entrenched
job discrimination and the other discriminatory practices
singled out for elimination: the blue-collar whites and
small farmers who provided the traditional backbone of NP
voter support.
Taken together with the Information Scandal, whose explo-
sion rocked public confidence in the NP during 1979, reaction
to the proposed reforms produced phenomenal by-election swings
against the NP. In Germiston, the far-right Herstigte Nasionale
Party vote jumped to 24%; at Kodoespoort the swing to the
HNP was 28%; and in Rustenberg a 35% swing left the HNP just
a few hundred votes from capturing its first seat. At the
same time, reformist noises were winning little credit on the
left, as the erosion of NP support by the liberal Progressive
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Federal Party in Edenvale made evident.
Losses of such magnitude were ominous to a Prime Minister
who had merely hinted at reforms and barely begun them. In-
stead of forging ahead, he pulled back sharply in 1980. His
caution was undoubtedly reinforced by a number of caucus battles
early in the year, in which Mr Botha backed down rather than
force his party to a split. His reformist initiatives also
met unexpectedly strong resistance within all the major
Afrikaans institutions, including the cjvii service, the
churches, and the Broederbond. In response, he zig-zagged
between vaguely reformist pronouncements and re-affirmations
of old principles, hiding behind a "12-point plan" with as
many interpretations as listeners.
As the Government eased off on the specifics of reform,
and the memory of Info began to fade, the National Party
began a recovery in the polls. Its support among the elector-
ate, which had fallen from 65% in the 1977 election to a low
of 46% in 1979, rose to 54% in 1980.1 Still, ominous signs
persisted. The HNP tide continued to flow in the Fauresmith
by-election, albeit weaker, with a 21% swing. Nationally,
a poll found support for the far right among Afrikaners up
from 2% in late 1978 to 9% in April 1980.2
Against this background, the Prime Minister decided to
abort the 1981 session of Parliament. In late January he
announced the dissolution of Parliament, setting an election
for 29 April.3
THE RESULTS
The campaign which followed was hard fought. The number
of uncontested seats fell from 44 in 1977 to 14. The HNP
fielded 28 more candidates, for a total of S3, while the PFP
ran ?3, an increase of 16.
The most.important fact which stood out in the results
was the 12% drop in the National Party vote, from 65% in 1977
to 53% in 1981, and the startling rise of the far right.
Beyond that, they revealed modest gains for the Progressives
in urban seats, and the continuing disintegration of the
centrist New Republic Party. (See Table 1) .
The Far Right: The far right improved its share of the
total vote from 3% in 1977 to 14% nationwide in 1981, garnering
almost 200 000 votes. Most of this went to the HNP, but in
a few seats there were significant turnouts for two smaller
groups, Dr Connie Mulder's National Conservative Party and a
group called Aksie-Eie Toekoms. The far right's new strength
was greater than even those substantial gains would suggest,
however. The HNP vote rose from a derisory 3% to 10% levels
to a respectable 20% to 30% in scores of farming and mining
seats. The party came within an ace of victory in several
seats for the first time, threatening even Transvaal National
Party leader Dr Andries Treurnicht.
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TABLE 1
ELECTION RESULTS, 1981 AND 1977
1981 1977
NP
SAP
PFP
NRP
HNP
NCP
Votes
778,371
-
265,297
93,603
191,249
19,149
% of
Vote
53%
-
18%
6%
1.3%
1%
Seats
131
-
26
8
-
Votes
689,108
17,915
177,705
123,245
34,161
% of
Vote
65%
2%
17%
12%
3%
Seats
134
3
17
10
_
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Across broad swathes of the country, Nationalist majori-
ties tumbled. In eaoh of the 24 Transvaal platteland seats
contested both times, there was a swing to the right. The
smallest was 18%, and the average was 25%. In the rural
Orange Free State, the smallest swing was 18% as well, with
an average of 21%. In 8 mining seats, the swing to the HNP
or NCP averaged 23%. Strikingly, the Herstigtes did almost
as well in seats where they were only strong enough to stand
for the first time as where they had stood before.
On the Rand and in Pretoria and Bloemfontein, substantial
swings to the right were noticeable in constituencies with
concentrations of white workers and lower-ranking civil
servants. In Natal, the HNP made important gains in 4 rural
seats. Even in the rural Cape, the Prime Minister's home turf,
gains were evident for the HNP, but the party's weak organisa-
tion there and the powerful Cape NP machine combined to restrict
them to the 6% to 20% range.
Nor was there evidence that the tide of support for the
far right flowing in the 1979-80 by-elections had crested.
In 5 of the 6 seats, the far right did as well as or better
than in the preceding by-election in terms of total votes and
in its share of the entire electorate. (In the sixth, Rusten-
berg, the fall-back was slight.) While the HNP percentage of
votes cast fell in 3 cases, this appears to reflect the lower
abstention rate among NP loyalists in general elections com-
pared to by-elections. But the steady growth in the share
of the constituencies' whole electorates willing to vote HNP
is far more indicative of its growing support.
The most evident fact about the 1981 election is that it
marked the point when it became respectable in the Afrikaans
community to vote for the far right. The HNP lost its image
as an oddball collection of ageing racist cranks. Indeed, one
of the most striking things about the crowds who flocked to
HNP election meetings was their very ordinariness. Some men
had the long sideburns and slicked-down short hair favoured
by Afrikaans Neanderthals, but there were also many well-
dressed middle-aged men and youths.
The Progressive Federal Party: The PFP's share of the
vote rose nationally from 17% to 18%. Its gains were slightly
greater than would appear from that comparison, because it
fought many previously uncontested seats, where its compara-
tively weak performance pushed down its average share of the
vote. In 104 seats contested both times, the PFP vote went
up from an average of 13,8% to 19,9%. (See Table 2)
The party made important gains in most major cities,
except Durban. It is difficult to present meaningful statis-
tics on its gains, due to the complex pattern of changes in
NP and NRP candidacies between 1977 and 1981. However, it
appears that in Johannesburg, the PFP squeezed the NP and NRP
votes hard in the Northern suburbs, registering gains ranging
from 9% and 10% in Bryanston and Bezuidenhout to 21% and 26%
in Sandton and Edenvale. In Pretoria, it made gains in the
more affluent constituencies, even though they were predom-
inantly Afrikaans-speaking. Cape Town was consolidated as a
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TABLE 2
SHARES OF THE VOTE IN SEATS CONTESTED
BOTH..IN- 1977. AND--1981
NP PFP NRP HNP
NCP
AET
1981 54,4% 19,9% 10,5% 14,7%
(— 30,4% — )
1977 69% 13,8% 13,6% 4,1%
( 26,4% )
Source: Election results in 104 seats contested both times
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PFP fief, with gains in every seat, ranging from 6% to 21%.
The PFP also made significant gains in the two Port Elizabeth
seats which it won, as well as in East London and Pietermaritz-
burg. Only in Durban was no clear pro-PFP trend evident, though
its vote appears to have at least held steady.
However, from a national perspective the Progressives'
gains appear relatively modest. In the main, they were
winning back traditional opposition sents lost in three-cor-
nered fights in 1977, such as Albany, Walmer, and Port Eliza-
beth Central. It is true that the party fought many rural
constituencies for the first time, registering 10% to 20%
of votes cast. But it failed to win a single seat outside
the big cities, with the exception of Albany, which contains
Rhodes University.
Moreover, the combined strength of the liberal opposition
remains below even its emasculated level of the mid-1970s.
The combined 26% of the vote reaped by the PFP and NRP toge-
ther is well below the doddering United Party's 37% vote of
1974, though an improvement on their shattering defeat of
1977. •* But as Table 2 shows, roughly one-half of the PFP * s
net 1981 gains in seats also contested in 1977 came from
NRP losses, leaving a true swing from the ruling party to
the Progressives of just 3%.
The New Republic Party: The 1981 election confirmed
the collapse of the NRP outside Natal, as well as showing up
its weakening in its home province. The NRP was dramatically
overtaken by the HNP as the third most popular party, polling
just 6% of the vote. Outside Natal, its total number of
candidatures fell from 28 in 1977 to 20.
Polls had shown that the NRP lost support outside Natal
between 1977 and 1980, despite the swing away from the NP, and
this finding was confirmed by the 1981 result5 In Cape Town,
in the seats where the NRP had not bowed out, it was battered
by the PFP. The same pattern was evident in Johannesburg's
affluent Northern suburbs, though the NRP scored some gains
from the National Party in the Southern suburbs. The party's
vote collapsed when the Nats entered the fray in its only non-
Natal seat. East London North, which it lost badly. (It did
wrest King William's Town from the NP, maintaining a token
presence outside its home province, but only because the HNP
came in to split the Afrikaans vote.)
In Natal, the NRP's vote dropped sharply when the NP and
PFP fought seats they had kept out of in 1977, and increased
significantly only where one or the other withdrew. Where
the pattern of candidatures was the same as before, there was
no consistent evidence of NRP gains, despite the general pro-
opposition trend in the election results.
The election results make it clear that the NRP survives
only by the grace of the NP and the PFP. Thus, it was allowed
a clear run in certain seats where one of the larger parties
preferred the NRP in to the other. (By this means, it secured
enough PFP withdrawals to retain control of the Natal Provincial
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Council). But where the bigger parties decided to knock
it out, as in East London North, it suffered big losses.
To judge by the results, the complete demise of the NRP
would release flows of voters in two directions. In urban
areas, the consequences of it withdrawal in Durban Pinetown
suggest the majority of its supporters would go to the PFP.
On the other hand, in the rural seat of Umhlatunza, the NRP
lost ground before the NP and HNP, and in Umlazi, where it
stood out this time, 21% of the vote went to the HNP.
AN EMERGENT CLASS CLEAVAGE?
An examination of the results of the 1981 election gives
the unmistakeable impression that the ethnic alignment which
dominated white South African electoral behaviour in the post-
•1948 era is breaking down. The old image which lines up all
Afrikaners behind the National Party while dividing English-
speakers behind the progeny of the United Party is no longer
tenable. According to a plausible estimate by one political
journalist, in 1981 some 38% of all Afrikaners voting did
not choose the National Party.6
A study of the pattern of changes in different types of
constituencies reinforces this impression. Constituencies
with concentrations of Afrikaans farmers, workers, and civil
servants saw heavy swings from the NP to the HNP. At the
same time, the NP held onto the English seats it had captured
in the Natal countryside and in the big cities. NRP voters
bolted left and right when candidates of their party were not
standing, while modest swings to the PFP occurred in some
Afrikaans constituencies.
This picture suggests that class and status tensions now
cut deeply across the old ethnic class alliances. The detailed
analysis of survey data which follows supports this view and
suggests the outlines of a possible realignment of the white
electorate.
Class and the Vote: Survey results underline the fact
that class is cutting strongly across the ethnic blocs.
Ethnicity and traditional party loyalties still have an
impressive hold, but the data suggest a strong pull on blue-
collar and farming communities in a conservative direction,
and movement among upper-status English and Afrikaans voters
towards more liberal parties.
This picture is drawn from detailed analysis of data
gathered in The Star's election poll, and is butressed by
information from other surveys. The Star's Market Research
Department conducted the newspaper's election survey, ques-
tioning 600 electors in the three constituencies of Kodoes-
poort, Waterkloof, and Durban Pinetown. While the resulting
sample was obviously not perfectly representative of the entire
country, the areas polled were diverse enough to contain
representatives of most social strata and every political
party.7 The differences which showed up among these different
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groups offer some indication of the differences more gener-
ally prevalent. (Due to legal requirements, the survey was
taken before Nomination Day, six weeks before the poll, and
therefore appears to have understated the movements of opinion
which, occurred during the campaign.) (See Table 3).
Comparison shows -t.ha.JPFP strongest (not surprisingly)
among upper-class English speakers, trouncing the NP by a
52% to 27% margin. Among blue-collar English speakers,
however, it is another story. The NP received a plurality
of 42% to 36% for the PFP, despite the trend in favour of
the Opposition in the electorate as a whole.
Similar though less pronounced cleavages were evident
among Afrikaners as well. The PFP received the voting inten-
tions of 24% of middleclass Afrikaners, compared to just 9%
of working-class Afrikaners, though the NP maintained com-
fortable majorities in both groups. While the number of
Afrikaans Progs was limited, it is worth noting that the
overwhelming majority of them came from an upper-status
background. On the other side of the fence, the HNP received
15% of the voting intentions of lower-status Afrikaners,
compared to just 5% among the better-off.
Class, Ideology, and Party: On the basis of these
figures, it is possible to see the outline of a potential
class alignment in white politics.
On the right, such an alignment would imply a link-up
between the HNP, the Nationalist right-wing (particularly in
Transvaal), and the NRP's remaining rural constituency. Such
an alignment would re-unite the "little men" who traditionally
supported the National Party: the white workers, small farmers,
and petty civil servants. (Already, as Harry Schwartz put it
during the campaign, "The HNP is merely the NP seeing itself
in yesterday's mirror.")8
The Government's timid moves towards reform—along with
its hints of others to follow-- have threatened the fragile
prosperity of these blue collar whites and smallholders. A
freer labour market and better black training would erode the
inflated wages of the white labour aristocracy. Many wage-
earning whites see real wages falling already, as inflation
sprints ahead while employers hold back on their increases
to push up blacks' breadline wages. Over the period 1975-1979,
real white wages fell on average of 9,7%, while black wages
rose 9,8% (from a drastically-lower base). Small farmers,
threatened with being driven off the land, are worried about
maize price increases and government policies which increa-
singly favour the big farmers. Farm incomes generally have
not done too well in recent years, with the biggest losses
sustained by the small farmers.
All these groups are bound together by the rigid racism
often found by those directly in the path of black advance.
When questioned about repeal of the Immorality Act in the
Star poll, for instance, working-class English-speakers and
Afrikaners were consistently more conservative than upper-
class individuals. (See Table 4). It is thus no small
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TABLE 3
10
ETHNICITY, SOCIAL STATUS,' AND THE VOTE
English-speakers
AB CD
NP
PFP
NRP
HNP
27%
52%
17%
2%
42%
36%
18%
2%
Afrikaners
AB CD
63%
24%
4%
5%
70%
9%
7%
14%
Source: The Star poll.
Note: In the status ranking used for The Star poll,
Category A represented higher professional and
managerial personnel, Category B included intermediate
professional, managerial, and supervisory workers,
and Categories C and D included lower supervisory,
clerical, unskilled and artisan workers.
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TABLE 4
ETHNICITY, SOCIAL STATUS, AND VIEWS ON
THE IMMORALITY ACT
Repeal Act
English-speakers
AB
.c  47%
Deal 31%
CD
41%
34%
Afrikaners
AB
47%
40%
CD
32%
43%
Source: The Star poll.
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wonder that miners and ticket-takers and many others who
knew they owe their livelihood to the colour of their skins
are drawn by the HNP's promise to go back to Verwoerd. The
other half of this emergent lineup would involve the progres-
sives, the NRP's urban supporters, and verligte Nationalists
(especially from the Cape). It would unite upper-income
individuals whose attitudes and interests seem to be con-
verging, whether they are English or Afrikaans-speaking.
It is significant that exactly equal percentages of upper-
class English-speakers and Afrikaners (47%) favoured the
repeal of the Immorality Act in the Star poll.9
Such evidence is indicative of the increasing coalescence
between the views of well-to-do Afrikaans and English-speakers.
As they have climbed up the economic ladder, many Afrikaners
have become less dependent on the artificial State support
for their position provided by classical apartheid. At the
same time, as they have acquired an increasing stake in South
Africa1s capitalist system, upper-class Afrikaners have become
more interested in reaching a racial accommodation to prevent
its violent overthrow.
A noteworthy fact, however, is that despite their agree-
ment with English-speakers on many issues, upper-class Afri-
kaners remain overwhelmingly pro-NP at present. They appear
reluctant to break with their traditional loyalties. Never-
theless , it should not be forgotten that the Star poll found
that 24% of the upper-class Afrikaners in its sample had al-
ready done so and planned to vote PFP.
In this scheme, there is no place for the New Republic
Party as it now exists. It is difficult to identify any cohe-
rent social group it can claim to represent. The party is
deeply divided with some of its supporters a bit to the left
of the NP, but with 52% of its Afrikaners and 18% of its
English-speakers saying Mr Botha wants change too quickly!10
Already, the modus Vivendi which united the rural sugar
barons with the white workers and industrialists of Durban
appears to be decomposing, as each group searches for the
party which serves its interests best. The Star poll found
NRP supporters to have the weakest attachment to their party
of any of the major parties, as well as being the readiest
to switch their votes to other parties. if the process of
realignment continues, the NRP can probably be expected to
disappear, even if it does not formally merge with another
party.
Factors promoting realignment'. The primary factor impel-
ling the process of realignment appears to be the changing
economic and numerical weight of the social classes within
Afrikanerdom. Thanks to the exercise of state power, the
years since 1948 have seen the rise of a substantial Afrikaans
bourgeoisie, carrying in its wake large numbers of profes-
sionals, managers, and university students. Between 1948
and 1975, Afrikaans control of non-agricultural production
rose from 10% to 21%, and the Afrikaans share of the profes-
sions went up from 16% to 38%.1X These changes brought into
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the dominant Afrikaans circles the very arguments for liber-
alisation which had been ignored coming from English-
speaking businessmen.
At the same time, there was a substantial decline in the
proportion of the "little men" in the Afrikaans community.
The proportion of Afrikaners working on the land or in blue
collar jobs shrank from 71% in 1946 to just 35% in 1977. lz
The little men's loss of electoral power also substantially
reduced their bargaining power within the National Party,
which became increasingly attentive to the pleas of the
"bigs" for racial reform.
The acceptance of the need for action has been heigh-
tened by the growing sense of urgency felt by whites in the
wake of the Soweto uprising and the Zimbabwe war. Between
1977 and 1980, the need to establish racial justice became
the Number One concern for party policy among both Afrikaans
and English-speakers, according to survey findings.13 The
same results linked this increasing sense of urgency to the
growth of verligte sentiment.
Concern at the increasing threats posed to white domin-
ance may, however, have a double-edged political effect.
It could be that the sense of an increasingly urgent threat
to the material position and physical survival of the lower-
status whites may well be hastening their movement to the
political right. The darkening internal and external secur-
ing position , then, may well be another factor which is
promoting political realignment in the white South African
electorate.
Factors retarding realignment r Traditional party
identifications appear to be" the most powerful brake opera-
ting on the process of realignment. Party identification is
the elector's sense of closeness or allegiance to a parti-
cular political party. It has been shown to have a strong
and consistent effect upon the vote in a number of different
countries, and the same studies have underlined that it changes
slowly, if at all.14 These changes reflect the long-term
experience of party policy and its material consequences for
the voter.x5
In South Africa, the findings of the Star poll make the
conserving role of party identification quite evident. Party
loyalties have been built up over time, through life under
the United and National Party governments, and they erode
slowly. (See Tables 5 and 6)
Afrikaans electors manifested an overwhelming allegiance
to the NP in the three constituencies polled. Some 63% of
upper-class, and 59% of working-class Afrikaners said they
normally thought of themselves as National Party supporters.
Of these groups, "very strong" identification with the NP was
reported by 59% of the working-class and 49% of the more
affluent Afrikaners. Just 12% of working-class and 9% of mid-
dle -class Afrikaans NP identifiers said their allegiance was
"not very strong".
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TABLE 5
. ETHNICITY,' SOCIAL' STATUS, AND PARTY ID
English-speakers
AB CD
NP 18% 23%
PFP 28% 16%
NRP 16% 14%
HNP 1% 1%
None 3 7 % 4 6 %
Afrikaners
AB
63%
11%
3%
4%
19%
CD
59%
5%
4%
4%
28%
Source: The Star poll
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TABLE 6
15
ETHNICITY, SOCIAL STATUS, AND STRENGTH
OF PARTY - IDENTITY
English-speakers Afrikaners
AB CD AB CD
NP
Very strong
Fairly strong
Not very strong
PFP
Very strong
Fairly strong
Not very strong
NRP
Very strong
Fairly strong
Not very strong
16%
62%
22%
24%
45%
7%
37%
19%
31%
30%
45%
24%
14%
63%
8%
17%
40%
39%
49%
43%
9%
36%
41%
1%
0%
70%
30%
59%
26%
12%
33%
56%
1%
68%
12%
12%
Too few HNP in sample for meaningful breakdowns
Source: The Star poll.
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Interestingly, only 11% of the more affluent Afrikaners
said they normally identified with the PFP, even though 24%
said they planned to vote Progressive in this election. It
was also the case that a significant number of Afrikaans
voters were without party identification altogether, with
19% of more affluent and 28% of blue-collar Afrikaners pro-
fessing no regular party allegiance. Nevertheless, the
figures suggest that a substantial further erosion of
National Party loyalty— or a split in the party— is nec-
essary before a really decisive realignment can take place.
The party loyalties of English-speaking voters are
still very much in flux, according to the poll results. In
the wake of the disintegration of the UP, a very large share
appear to have no regular party loyalty. This is the case for
37% of upper-status English speakers, and for a startling 46%
of the blue-collar ones. The class division noted in the
voting intentions poll is reproduced here, with a PFP plura-
lity among the well-to-do and an NP advantage among the worse
off, but the pattern is much weaker. This suggests that the
partisan moorings of many English-speaking voters are still
weak, and that they are still drifting between partisan homes.
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
Election outcomes are, of course, more than a reflection
of glacial change in social structure and political attitudes
They also reflect the strategies of the contending parties.
As Alan Lichtman observed after an analysis of American elec-
tion results,
"Changes in voting are not the inevitable result of
social and economic change ... (V)oting cycles do not
ebb and flow with automatic tidal regularity. Histo-
rical events create opportunities that can be exploited
by shrew political strategy and responsive policy, ox-
squandered by blunders and unwise policy."1
To examine how the parties took advantage of the oppor-
tunities offered by the lay of the electorate in 1981, it is
thus necessary to examine their respective strategies and
impact.
The National Party: Confronted with growing opposition
to his desired direction, since early 1980 Mr P W Botha's
strategy has been to blur his plans as much as possible.
This approach continued into the General Election campaign.
As it unfolded, Willem Kleynhans was led to comment, "The
Prime Minister is fighting this election on a platform which
can be interpreted in 1001 ways—all of them conservative."17
The Nationalist campaign went through two phases. Ini-
tially, the stress was on the "total onslaught" against
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white South Africa, evidently with a set-piece replay of
the 1977 campaign in mind. Soon, however, it was clear
that this approach was faiing to stem the HNP tide.
For the first campaign in recent memory, the National
Party was forced onto the defensive. The NP's response
was to tack hard right, emphasising traditional themes
and loyalties. Some idea of the flavour of this campaign
can be garnered from a special advertising supplement the
party inserted in all the major Afrikaans newspapers. Beg-
inning by asking, "Is it true that the Government is selling
out the white man?" it answered (in part):
"The average expenditure per white child in South
Africa is R810 a year against R91,29 per black child.
There are good historical and other reasons for this,
but does it look like discrimination against the whites?
"Between 1970 and 1980, 317 000 people, or about 51 000
families, were moved out of wrongly situated areas
and black spots and settled properly in their own
homelands. Is this an example of a party striving
for integration?
"To speak of school integration is a malicious untruth.
"There is no discussion of a new declaration of open
beaches. It is not the Government's policy."18
Similar notes were struck by Nat speakers on the hustings.
Thus, for instance, the Prime Minister slammed opponents of
the Group Areas Act, and pledged not to grant freehold title
of land to urban blacks, while only offering occasional nods
in the direction of reform. To reinforce the message, the
Government lashed out on a large round of salary increases for
civil servants and policemen, two groups whose loyalty was
feared to be wavering, in the week before the election.
However, it was clear that the leadership was preaching
to an unenthusiastic audience. Some six weeks before the
election, fully 21% of traditional NP identifiers, in the three
constituencies polled by The Star were uncommitted. Attendance
at NP campaign meetings was also notably low, according to
journalists covering them. The Minister of Internal Affairs,
Mr Chris Heuriis, was even forced to cancel a planned eve-of-poll
meeting in Port Elizabeth when an embarassing handful of people
turned out to hear him in a large hall.
Nevertheless, Mr Botha kept most of the faithful loyal
(if not necessarily happy) through the neat trick of convincing
liberal voters he was a liberal, and conservatives he was con-
servative. According to the Star poll, some 71% of verligte
voters thought Mr Botha was moving in the right direction,
along with 68% of verkramptes. In other words, Mr Botha
succeeded in keeping his aims so unclear that voters of every
persuasion could see their own image in them.
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The Herstigte Nasionale Party: The obvious response
for the far right was to tell its potential electors that
Mr Botha was not so conservative after all. The perception
of Mr Botha as a liberal appears to have been the most
important factor pushing verkrampte electors towatds an HNP
vote. In the Star poll, 35% of verkramptes who thought Mr
Botha was going in the wrong direction indicated an intention
to vote HNP, compared to just 16% of those who approved of his
direction (though samples were small in each case).19
To sway as many voters as possible, the HNP tried to
highlight all the NP's past statements and actions on reform,
spelling out the implications (and exaggerating where neces-
sary) . Thus, the HNP campaign literature alleged that Mr
Botha aimed at a multi-racial constitution for South Africa
and planned the repeal of the Immorality Act. It also said
he deliberately encouraged inflation to redistribute income
from white to black, and was preparing for complete racial
integration in the country. The party made a special effort in
mining seats, intensively publicising the forthcoming recom-
mendation from the Wiehahn Commission that mine blasting
certificates should be awarded to blacks as well as whites.
The party pushed its point so hard that former PFP MP Zac
de Beer was moved to comment, "The voters have been led to
believe the Nats are Progs in wolves' clothing."20
Where the message got through, right-wing voters swung
to the HNP. A look at individual constituencies shows how
HNP support solidified as the party hammered its ideas home.
The Star found that in Kodoespoort, a constituency with many
working-class and farming voters, 15% of those with a voting
intention six weeks before polling day planned to vote HNP.
Some 35% of the electorate was uncommitted. In the election,
the HNP received 30% of the vote, while the NP vote fell from
67% in the survey to 60% in the ballot.
Parallel findings were reached by a Sunday Times poll,
which surveyed Carletonville and Randfontein as well as Ko-
doespoort. Far right support in the three seats averaged
15% according to the Times poll, also taken before Nomination
Day, while the HNP and NCP gained an average of 37% of the
vote in the three seats.21
The Progressive Federal Party: The PFP, for its part,
played down racial issues and fought a bread-and-butter cam-
paign centred on economic and security issues. Its liberal
image appeared something of a liability as it attempted to
broaden its support. More than 40% of NP Afrikaners had seen
its leader, Dr. Frederik van Z.yl Slabbert, as too sympathetic
to blacks and wanting change too quickly, an opinion shared
by roughly similar or larger proportions of NP English-
speakers and NRP supporters.22 The party commissioned a
voluminous private poll in late 1980, which repeated these
findings but underscored the strength of discontent with the
Government's performance on economic issues.
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Those issues became the basis of the PFP campaign.
While not walking away from its liberal race policies, the
party did not stress them, except in vaguely worded calls
for negotiation instead of confrontation. Indeed, the party
never even issued a formal policy manifesto. Like the HNP,
it slated the Government record on inflation and pensions.
(It was aided in this respect by Health Minister Lapa Munnik's
astounding blunder in saying pensioners could live on a R20-
a-month diet a few days before the poll.) Besides playing on
its attractive, Afrikaner leader, the party ran an increased
number of Afrikaans candidates and made greater use of Afrik-
aans in its propaganda in an attempt to broaden its appeal
across the ethnic divide.23
The rewards can be seen in the analysis of the Star data
from Waterkloof, an affluent Afrikaans seat. PFP support
increased from 31% to 38% in the six weeks to the poll, while
NP strength slipped from 55% to 52%.
PROSPECTUS FOR THE FUTURE
The evidence presented above shows that Mr Botha commands
his fractious majority on the basis of a successful appeal to
both right and left. In his ability to persuade both liberals
and conservatives he is one of them, his opinion profile is
remarkably similar to that of Jimmy Carter in the 1976 elect-
ion.24 As Mr Carter learned, however, such a coalition is
effective for winning elections, but useless for governing.
A decisive move to one side loses support on the other. The
Prime Minister's dilemma could be simply summed up in an old
aphorism, as Tertius Myburgh noted soon after the election:
"Those ahead of him cried "forward,"'while those behind
cried 'back!'" .25
Nevertheless, as H J Kotze put it, it was clear that
"the Prime Minister will have to take note of the swing to
the right, because these voters came from the NP. There is
potential for a much bigger swing to the right."26
Despite the gradual rise of more liberal attitudes on
race questions, particularly among the more affluent sectors
of the electorate, a strong undertow of conservative sentiment
still exists. (See Table 7). A 1980 poll found majorities
of Afrikaners opposed to the repeal of the Immorality Act,
cinema apartheid, or the Group Areas Act. More than 30%
of the English-speaking population failed to indicate its
acceptance of the same steps. (Doubtless far stronger opposi-
tion would be recorded to measures which actively aimed at
redistributing opportunities and income to blacks).
Since the majority of Afrikaners stuck by the National
Party despite the numerous defections in this campaign, it
seems safe to say that many NP supporters have attitudes more
like HNP members. The threads of loyalty still binding them
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TABLE 7
WHITE- ATTITUDES ON RACIAL ISSUES
Per cent accepting -
blacks at white
sports clubs
blacks at white
cinemas
repeal of immo-
rality act
blacks in some
white schools
some blacks in
white residential
areas
English-speakers Afrikaners
1977 1980 1977 1980
81% 82%
66% 70%
53%
69%
64%
68%
53% 58%
blacks in white
recreational areas 53% 55%
40%
28%
23%
19%
18%
19%
46%
37%
28%
23%
23%
23%
Source: Schlemmer, Sunday Tribune, 11 May 1980
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to the party threaten to fray if it moves to implement
reform. Moreover, the Star poll found that of those elec-
tors with no party identification in the three seats it
polled, 64% were considered verkramp. These voters could be
easily pushed onto the far right by a reformist NP regime.
Consequently, the right-wing threat to the dominance
of the verligte Nationalists is very real. Had the NP not
previously enjoyed near unanimous support in farming and
mining seats, the 20% swings recorded would have produced a
slaughter of 1948 dimensions.
If Mr Botha took his courage in his hands and split his
party, as urged by some, the resulting upheaval would be
enormous. Consider:
— A mere 5% further swing would yield the HNP 2 seats.
— A uniform nationwide swing of 10% would give the far
right 9 seats.
— A 20% nationwide swing to the far right— perhaps the
smallest the Prime Minister could expect in case of
a split, since it implies he keeps two-thirds of the
NP vote -would yield 40 seats for the far right. It
would also render 14 more seats marginal on a 5% swing
Since the NP has only 48 seats more than a majority in
Parliament, a split could thus make possible the unthinkable:
electoral defeat for the National Party. Moreover, these
predictions of far right gains in such an event have been
based on the highly conservative premise of a uniform na-
tional swing. If the concentration of HNP support observed
in the 1981 election were repeated in the next, with HNP
gains in its strong farming and mining seats running at twice
the average national anti-NP swing, it might take 30 or more
seats from the NP on just a 10% national swing.
In the event of a split, the far right would be very
strong in Transvaal and Free State country, mining, and
working-class seats, though it would be weak in Natal and
very weak in the Cape. The position of the right in such a
case would be strengthened by two peculiarities of the
South African political system. First, because the National
Party is federal in structure, the Transvaal NP would be
likely to secede, taking the party's proven election-fighting
machine out of the hands of P W Botha. Second, the platte-
land enjoys disproportionately large weight in Parliament, due
to the constitutional provision for the under-loading rural
seats.
At this stage, the far right appears to have one Achilles
Heel: its virtual absence of English-speaking support. (In-
deed, the Herstigte Nasionale Party does not even have an
English name.) As the surveys cited above showed, so far the
working-class English speakers have stayed with the NP, and
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to a lesser degree the PFP and NRP. For its part, the HNP
has repelled English voters with its call for Afrikaans as
the only official language. Without them, a split in the NP
might allow the far right to form an opposition bloc of 40
to 60 seats in favourable circumstances, but not to form a
government on its own.
It should not be forgotten, however, that the working-
class English vote is "up for grabs". The group's allegiance
to the NP is new, and its proportion of members without party
identification (46%) is the highest of any of the ethnic or
class groups in the Star poll. If the HNP relaxed its lan-
guage policy,and Mr Botha embarked on reforms which threa-
tened English-speaking workers and drove figures they resp-
ect onto the far right, an alternative Parliamentary major-
ity could be in the making..
The problem of the PFP,like that of the HNP, also lies
in its limited social base. As long as it remains the
party of affluent urban English-speakers, and to a lesser
degree affluent Afrikaners, the 40 to 50 seats held by the
old United Party in its declining years would appear to be
its ceiling. It is clearly consolidating its position as
the leading Parliamentary Opposition party, but by itself it,
too appears unlikely to be able to command sufficient sup-
port to win a Parliamentary majority.
However, the Progressives would be in a strong position
to act as a partner for the Prime Minister if he decided to
implement reform. It is already evident that the present
social base of the National Party is unable to support even
the timid programme of reform outlined by the Prime Minister.
It is equally clear, however, that a merger or coalition with
the PFP in the wake of a showdown with his right wing would—
by nature of the new class alliance— commit Mr Botha to much
more far-reaching change than he has ever publicly hinted he
is willing to accept.
Such an alliance would replace the ethnic Afrikaner
Nationalist alliance with a purely bourgeois ruling party.
(In some respects, it would be similar to the old UP linkup
of English-speakers and well-to-do Afrikaners.) The new
party would hardly be radical; indeed, it might spirit the
difference between the current stands of the verligte Nats
and the PFP. It could be expected to be firm in its support
for capitalism and its opposition to simple majority rule.
Nevertheless, it would probably be willing to attempt some
form of power sharing, re-institute some civil liberties,
and offer blacks drastically more (at the expense of the
Afrikaans workers, small farmers and petit bourgeoisie) in
a bid to avert an anti-capitalist revolution.
For the National Party, the only alternative to this
linkup in the continuation of its present paralysis, with
support crumbling steadily on both sides and the spread
of revolutionary sentiment among blacks.27 It is not now
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clear whether the Prime Minister is dithering, between the
possibilities, or whether he is waiting for the verlig tide
to rise further before he sets off on an uncharted course.
The 1981 election posed the question which he and his party
must confront: rupture or stasis? Only history will be
able to give the answer.
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